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JAMIE S. V. MILWAUKEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
URBAN CHALLENGES CAUSE SYSTEMIC
VIOLATIONS OF THE IDEA
I.

INTRODUCTION

Child Find1 is one of the most important provisions, if not the most
important provision, of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA). Child Find requires states and districts to identify, locate, and
evaluate all children with disabilities. 2 The IDEA mandates that a state must
provide a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) to every child with a
disability as a prerequisite to receiving federal funding to help educate
children with disabilities.3 The IDEA defines FAPE as ―special education and
related services.‖4 If a school district violates the Child Find provision, this
necessarily means that the district did not provide the student an appropriate
FAPE.5 A failure to provide a child access to a FAPE causes a complete
failure of the IDEA because FAPE is the ―overriding concern of the Act.‖ 6
Thus, Child Find is a gate-keeping provision that requires identification of
children with disabilities. 7 Identification leads to access to appropriate special
education and other related services to which all disabled children are entitled
by the IDEA. 8
In Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin delivered an opinion holding that
Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) and the Wisconsin Department of Public
Instruction (DPI) violated the IDEA by failing to comply with the
requirements of Child Find.9 The court determined the issue of liability;
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3) (2006).
2. Id. § 1412(a)(3)(A).
3. Id. § 1412(a)(1).
4. Id. § 1401(9).
5. See Dep‘t of Educ. v. Cari Rae S., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1196 (D. Haw. 2001).
6. Clay T. v. Walton County Sch. Dist., 952 F. Supp. 817, 821 (M.D. Ga. 1997).
7. See JOHN W. NORLIN, IDENTIFY, LOCATE AND EVALUATE: CHILD FIND UNDER THE IDEA
AND SECTION 504, at 1 (2002).
8. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (mandating that a free appropriate public education must be
available to ―all children‖ with disabilities).
9. 519 F. Supp. 2d 870, 903 (E.D. Wis. 2007). The court also found DPI in violation of IDEA.
Id. As part of its oversight responsibilities of DPI of special education, DPI is required to monitor
school districts and assure each district‘s compliance with federal and state law. Id. at 873. A
complete discussion of DPI‘s liability is beyond the scope of this Note, and MPS will be the focus.
In addition to violating the IDEA, both MPS and DPI violated related state statutes that effectuate the
provisions of the IDEA. See id. at 903, 880. This Note largely focuses on federal legislation, namely
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however, before the court enters a judgment, it must determine appropriate
remedies for the plaintiff class and appropriate sanctions for MPS.10
This Note argues that while the decision of Jamie S.—finding systemic
violations of MPS‘s Child Find procedures—was justified, the systemic
violations of MPS are largely due to unique challenges faced by urban school
districts, like the MPS district. Part II gives an overview of special education
law, including its beginnings as a social movement, the more recent legal
movement, and an extensive discussion of the Child Find mandate. Part III
provides a synopsis of the facts of Jamie S. and each of MPS‘s systemic
violations of the IDEA. Part IV argues that MPS‘s failure to comply with
Child Find is rooted in the challenges faced by an urban school district, and
these challenges make compliance with the IDEA extremely difficult. Part V
discusses the remedies and sanctions awarded in the case, including the
settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and DPI and the remedy imposed
by the court upon completion of Phase III litigation. Additionally, Part V
argues for a new standard for urban school districts: courts should require
satisfactory compliance instead of 100% compliance, which the IDEA
currently requires. Further, in order to achieve satisfactory compliance courts
must impose tailored remedies that take into account all of the urban
challenges faced by MPS and similar districts.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE IDEA
A. Social Movement
Early treatment of individuals with disabilities revolved around social
movements. Various social movements led the way these individuals were
treated because there were no legal standards for treatment until the late
twentieth century.11 The earliest treatment of individuals with disabilities
focused on segregating and removing these individuals from their families and
communities.12 Extreme treatment such as infanticide and shunning was
common of individuals with disabilities in the seventeenth century. 13
By the mid-1900s, institutionalization peaked and was society‘s primary
way of dealing with individuals with disabilities. 14 At this time, a publicly

the IDEA.
10. Id. at 904.
11. See LARRY D. BARTLETT ET AL., SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 5 (2d ed. 2007).
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. See NIKKI L. MURDICK ET AL., SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 3 (2d ed. 2007).
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supported institution was in every state. 15 The goals of institutionalizing
individuals with disabilities were to contain them and their behavior and to
protect the communities from which these people came. 16 These individuals
were excluded from virtually all activities in the community including public
schools.17 This policy forced institutions to provide lifelong care as it was
unlikely that an individual with a disability would have the skills to live
independently.18 Mass institutionalization resulted in overcrowding, which
spurred public concern over the quality of life afforded to individuals with
disabilities.19
The social movement of deinstitutionalization was society‘s response to
the quality-of-life concerns.20
The movement‘s goal was to release
individuals with disabilities back into their communities in order to integrate
them into society to become productive citizens. 21
During
deinstitutionalization, parents of children with disabilities became advocates
by forming powerful local and national support groups aimed at getting their
children into tax-supported public schools. 22
The emergence of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and early
1970s greatly affected educational services in this nation.23 An overarching
concern for the individual characterized the movement.24 There were many
victories in this era expanding the civil rights of individuals of different
races.25 These victories also affected the rights of individuals with
disabilities. Advocates of these individuals used Brown v. Board of
Education26 to oppose the exclusion of individuals with disabilities from
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 3–4. The source was a national study completed by the American Association on
Mental Deficiency and examining 134 public institutions. Id. at 4. The results indicated that 60% of
institutions were overcrowded, 50% rated below minimum safety standards, 89% did not meet
acceptable attendant/resident ratios, 83% did not meet professional staffing requirements, and 60%
provided insufficient space for education and recreation. Id.
20. Id. at 5–6.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 6–7.
23. See MURDICK ET AL., supra note 14, at 8–9.
24. See id.
25. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401
(D.D.C. 1967).
26. In Brown, the plaintiffs alleged that African-American children who were required to attend
segregated schools were denied the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.
347 U.S. at 488. This United States Supreme Court decision overturned Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), in its holding that ―separate but equal‖ schools were inadequate and required that
the opportunity of education must be made available to all children on equal terms. Brown, 347 U.S.
at 488, 495. This decision provided the basis for future rulings that children with disabilities may not
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public schools.27 This case became ―the basic tenet for later federal
legislation guaranteeing educational and civil rights for persons with
disabilities.‖28
B. Legal Movement
The progression of each social movement combined with the explosion of
court decisions 29 prompted a legal movement to enact legislation to codify and
expand the foundations of the Civil Rights Movement for individuals with
disabilities.30 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197331 was the legal
movement‘s first legislative effort.32 Section 504 made it ―illegal to deny
participation in activities, benefits of programs, or to in any way discriminate
against a person with a disability solely because of that disability. . . .
Individuals with disabilities must have equal access to‖ any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 33 Section 504 did not provide
any funding; it provided only a guarantee of rights.34
1. Education for All Handicapped Children Act
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA)35 was the
follow-up to Section 504 and laid the foundation for the most significant piece
of legislation for individuals with disabilities today—the IDEA.36 EAHCA
be excluded from public schools solely based upon having a disability. See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of
Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 874–75 (D.D.C. 1972) (preventing schools from further excluding,
suspending, expelling, reassigning, and transferring students with disabilities out of public schools
without due process of law).
27. MURDICK ET AL., supra note 14, at 9.
28. Id. at 8–9.
29. See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (holding ―the doctrine of ‗separate but equal‘ has no
place‖ in public education); Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878 (holding that every child is entitled ―a free and
suitable publicly-supported education regardless of the degree of the child‘s mental, physical or
emotional disability or impairment‖); Pa. Ass‘n for Retarded Citizens v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp.
279, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (enjoining the State of Pennsylvania from denying education to children
with mental retardation who reside in the state); Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 513 (declaring the policy of
mislabeling and segregating African-American students a violation of the school system‘s public
responsibilities).
30. MURDICK ET AL., supra note 14, at 14.
31. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)).
32. MURDICK ET AL., supra note 14, at 14.
33. JIM YSSELDYKE & BOB ALGOZZINE, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF SPECIAL EDUCATION :
A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR EVERY TEACHER 11 (2006).
34. MURDICK ET AL., supra note 14, at 14.
35. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1461 (2006)).
36. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006)) (renaming the act the Individuals with Disabilities Education
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improved upon Section 504 in two obvious ways. First, it combined
guarantees of rights for individuals with disabilities with federal funding. 37
Second, it focused only on school-aged children, while Section 504 covered
children, employees, and others who may visit a school.38
EAHCA was based on several core principles that still exist in the current
version of the IDEA. The first principle, ―zero reject,‖39 establishes that all
children with disabilities, regardless of severity or type of impairment, are
entitled to receive a ―free appropriate public education.‖40 The second
principle, nondiscriminatory assessment, states that all ―testing and evaluation
materials and procedures utilized for the purposes of evaluation and
placement of children with disabilities for services under this chapter will be
selected and administered so as not to be racially or culturally
discriminatory.‖41
The third principle requires students with disabilities to be educated in
their least restrictive environment. 42 The preferred placement for students
with disabilities is in the general education classroom with students who are
not disabled. 43 Students with disabilities should be removed from that
environment only when a disability is severe enough that instruction in the
general education classroom is ineffective. 44
Finally, the fourth principle is the requirement of an individualized
education program (IEP).45 An IEP is a written document that describes the
student‘s level of functioning, goals and objectives, duration of services, and
evaluation procedures to monitor progress. 46 Parent participation is vital in
this process, and EAHCA requires parents to be part of the IEP team. 47

Act).
37. ALLAN G. OSBORNE, JR. & CHARLES J. RUSSO, SPECIAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW: A
GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS 10–11 (2d ed. 2006).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 10; see also Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 1990)
(explaining that the EAHCA adopted the ―zero reject‖ principle).
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2006).
41. Id. § 1412(a)(6)(B).
42. Id. § 1412(a)(5).
43. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 1412(a)(4).
46. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
47. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i); MURDICK ET AL., supra note 14, at 24–28; YSSELDYKE &
ALGOZZINE, supra note 33, at 20.
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2. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
The reauthorization of the EAHCA was amended and renamed the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 48 Congress enacted the IDEA in
1990, amended it in 1997, and reauthorized the law in 2004.49 As described
earlier, the IDEA is much narrower in scope than Section 504. To qualify for
services under the IDEA, a child must meet three requirements. First, the
child must be between the ages of three and twenty-one years old.50 Second,
the child must have a specifically identifiable disability. 51 Third, the child
must show a need for special education services. 52
The IDEA aims to improve educational results for individuals with
disabilities. The purpose is ―to ensure that all children with disabilities have
available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special
education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and
prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.‖ 53
The IDEA provides federal funding to states for the education of individuals
with disabilities, provided the states comply with certain goals and
procedures.54
3. Child Find
In exchange for federal funds, states must comply with the Child Find
provision. This places an affirmative duty on states or local education
agencies (LEAs) to develop and implement a practical method used to
identify, locate, and evaluate all children with disabilities residing within the
state.55 The Child Find duty has long been a crucial component of the IDEA
as it is the gateway to receiving the benefits of other provisions of the Act.

48. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1487).
49. See id.; Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. 105-17,
111 Stat. 37 (adding new amendments to the Act); Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified as 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482).
To avoid confusion, all three laws will be referred to collectively as the IDEA.
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A).
51. See id. § 1401(3)(A)(i). A child with a specifically identifiable disability is a child ―with
mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments,
visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance . . . , orthopedic
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning
disabilities; and who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.‖ Id.
§ 1401(3)(A)(i)–(ii).
52. Id. § 1401(3)(A)(ii).
53. Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
54. See id. § 1412(a).
55. Id. § 1412(a)(3)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(a)(i) (2008). States also have enacted provisions
governing the duties of LEAs. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 115.77 (2007–2008).
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Unless a child is ―found,‖ meaning he or she is identified as potentially having
a disability, that student is not entitled to special education services of any
kind. 56
Under the Child Find provisions, states or LEAs are required to
implement policies and procedures ensuring that:
All children with disabilities residing in the State . . .
regardless of the severity of their disabilities, and who are in
need of special education and related services, are identified,
located, and evaluated and a practical method is developed
and implemented to determine which children with
disabilities are currently receiving needed special education
and related services. 57
The Child Find provision is very broad in scope, and successful
compliance is difficult to achieve. 58 ―Not only must districts establish
virtually fail-safe procedures to find students with disabilities within the
school system, but they must also make determined efforts to locate students
who either are not yet in school or are enrolled in private or parochial
schools.‖59 In Wisconsin, schools are required to identify, locate, and
evaluate all children with disabilities from birth through age twenty-one. 60
Child Find aims to protect all children who reside in a state, including
children who attend public and private schools, highly mobile children,
migrant children, homeless children, and children who are wards of the
state.61
Child Find also includes ―[c]hildren who are suspected of being a child
with a disability . . . and in need of special education, even though they are
advancing from grade to grade.‖62 ―[T]he child find duty is triggered when
the state or LEA has reason to suspect a disability, and reason to suspect that
special education services may be needed to address that disability.‖63 If the
school district fails to act on the child‘s behalf when this duty is triggered, the

56. See D.L. v. District of Columbia, 450 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13–14 (D.D.C. 2006).
57. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
58. NORLIN, supra note 7, at vii.
59. Id.
60. WIS. STAT. §§ 115.76(3), 115.77(1m)(a).
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(a)(1)(i), (c)(2) (2008).
62. 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(c)(1) (emphasis added).
63. Dep‘t of Educ. v. Cari Rae S., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 (D. Haw. 2001) (quoting Corpus
Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 31 IDELR 41, 158 (1999) (internal quotations omitted)).
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district has defaulted in its obligation to identify, locate, and evaluate all
children with disabilities. 64
The Child Find duty is an affirmative one. 65 A parent‘s failure to request
a special education evaluation for their child does not relieve the district of its
duties. 66 School districts may not await parental demands to evaluate a
child.67 Furthermore, a district‘s unawareness of a student‘s potential
disability does not relieve the district of its duties; it should have suspected
the disability. 68 The IDEA does not provide any guidance to school districts
on how to comply with Child Find‘s affirmative duty.69 Thus, the issue of
whether a particular district is in compliance is largely ―in the hands of courts
and administrative agencies.‖70 Instead of providing specific methods that
districts must use to comply, the IDEA requires each state to devise a
―practical method‖ to determine which children are receiving needed special
education services and which children are not receiving services but should
be. 71
There are varieties of methods that have been used to comply with the
identification step of Child Find. The Office for Civil Rights of the United
States Department of Education has accepted plans including, but not limited
to, door-to-door surveys, brochures, mailings, public education programs and
other public meetings, physician referrals, contacts with day care providers,
and surveys of private school personnel. 72 Other accepted public awareness
programs used to identify children with disabilities include medical outreach;
television advertisements; coordination with hospitals, clinics, and service
agencies; and periodic school screening.73 Using assessment test results to
screen students has also been found to be an acceptable method. 74 In Clay T.
64. See id. at 1196.
65. NORLIN, supra note 7, at vii.
66. Id. at 1.
67. Branham v. District of Columbia, 427 F.3d 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2005)); Scott v. District of
Columbia, No. 03-1672 DAR, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14900, at *20 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2006) (quoting
Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 518–19 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
68. NORLIN, supra note 7, at 1.
69. Id. at 2. The Child Find provision is consistent with the rest of the IDEA in that it places
―excessive focus on process over substance.‖ Samuel R. Bagenstos, Where Have All the Lawsuits
Gone? The Shockingly Small Role of the Courts in Implementing the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act 2 (Wash. U. Sch. of Law Faculty Working Papers Series No. 08-12-05, Nov. 15,
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1302085. Some critics view this lack of guidance for
school districts as one of the main downfalls of the federal legislation. See id. at 1–2.
70. NORLIN, supra note 7, at 2.
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2006).
72. Pamela Wright & Peter Wright, The Child Find Mandate: What Does It Mean to You?,
WRIGHTSLAW, Sept. 26, 2007, http://www.wrightslaw.com/info/child.find.mandate.htm.
73. BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 11, at 44.
74. See RUTH A. WILSON, SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS IN THE EARLY YEARS 160–61

2009]

URBAN CHALLENGES TO SPECIAL EDUCATION

865

v. Walton County School District,75 the court found that a school district that
relied upon periodic assessment test results in concluding a student was not
eligible for special education did not violate Child Find.76
All of these methods have been found to satisfy a school district‘s general
identification responsibilities; however, if a student is not identified and found
eligible for special education services in a timely manner, Child Find may still
be violated.77 Additionally, the school district may ―[n]ot use any single
measure or assessment as the sole criterion for determining whether a child is
a child with a disability and for determining an appropriate educational
program for the child.‖78 Instead, the regulations require the district to ―[u]se
a variety of assessment tools and strategies.‖ 79
School districts and public agencies must give written notice whenever
they propose, refuse to initiate, or change ―the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate
public education to the child.‖80 This is a procedural safeguard in place for
the parents of the child.81 A district‘s refusal to evaluate a child after a
parental request can demonstrate the district had knowledge of a child‘s
disability, thus violating the evaluation requirement of Child Find if that child
is later diagnosed with a disability. 82
To receive federal funding under Part C (special service from birth to two
years) of the IDEA, dealing with early intervention of infants and toddlers,
states are required to establish ―[a] comprehensive child find system . . .
including a system for making referrals to service providers . . . that ensures
rigorous standards for appropriately identifying infants and toddlers with

(1998). For more examples of effective Child Find strategies, see JUDITH A. BONDURANT -UTZ,
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ASSESSING INFANTS AND PRESCHOOLERS WITH SPECIAL NEEDS 174–76
(2002).
75. 952 F. Supp. 817 (M.D. Ga. 1997).
76. Id. at 823–24. Clay, the student in this case, took assessment tests in first, second, and third
grades without demonstrating any significant decreased academic achievement. Id. at 819–20. Clay
earned low marks in several classes; however, Clay testified that this was due to his failure to
complete homework. Id. at 819. The next year, Clay was diagnosed with a learning disability. Id. at
820. Clay‘s parents asserted that the district failed to comply with Child Find because their son was
never referred for special education services. Id. at 820–21. The court rejected this assertion finding
the school district‘s screening and assessment procedures in compliance with Child Find. Id. at 823–
24.
77. E.g., W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 501 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that ―a school official
who failed to carry out his or her ‗child find‘ duty within a reasonable time ‗would understand that
what he is doing violates that duty‘‖) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
78. 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(b)(2) (2008); see also WILSON, supra note 74, at 164, 169.
79. 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(b)(1).
80. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3)(A)–(B) (2006).
81. See id. § 1415.
82. NORLIN, supra note 7, at 9.
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disabilities for services.‖83 To locate, identify, and evaluate infants and
toddlers with disabilities, many school districts conduct annual screening days
for kindergarteners and preschool-aged children. 84
Child Find is the first step to providing special education to all children
who need it. Meeting the Child Find duty is very ―challenging‖ and requires
school districts to establish ―fail-safe procedures to find students with
disabilities.‖85 Compliance challenges are even greater in urban school
districts like MPS versus smaller, suburban school districts.86
III. THE JAMIE S. DECISION: SYSTEMIC VIOLATIONS OF CHILD FIND
Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools began in September 2001, when the
plaintiffs filed a complaint against MPS and DPI alleging violations of the
IDEA. 87 Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification,
seeking to proceed on their complaints with class action status.88 The court
entered a decision and order granting class status and defined the class as
follows:
Those students eligible for special education services from
the Milwaukee Public School System who are, have been or
will be either denied or delayed entry or participation in the
processes, which result in a properly constituted meeting
between the [individualized education program] team and the
parents or guardians of the student. 89
As a result of the plaintiffs‘ class certification, in order to find that the
defendants violated the rights of the plaintiff class, all violations of the IDEA
must be ―systemic violations, violations that were not amenable to individual
exhaustion.‖90
[A] claim is ―systemic‖ if it implicates the integrity or
reliability of the IDEA dispute resolution procedures
83. 20 U.S.C. § 1435(a)(5) (2006).
84. OSBORNE & RUSSO, supra note 37, at 40–41.
85. NORLIN, supra note 7, at vii.
86. JASON SNIPES ET AL., MDRC FOR THE COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCH., FOUNDATIONS
FOR SUCCESS : CASE STUDIES OF HOW URBAN SCHOOL SYSTEMS IMPROVE STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT
21–29 (2002), available at http://www.cgcs.org/images/Publications/Foundations.pdf; Michael
Heise, Litigated Learning, Law’s Limit, and Urban School Reform Challenges, 85 N.C. L. REV.
1419, 1419–24 (2007).
87. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 519 F. Supp. 2d 870, 871 (E.D. Wis. 2007).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 881.
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themselves or requires restructuring the education system
itself in order to comply with the dictates of the Act; but that
it is not ―systemic‖ if it involves only a substantive claim
having to do with limited components of a program, and if the
administrative process is capable of correcting the problem. 91
The court separated the trial into three phases. Phase I involved the
presentation of expert witness testimony. 92 The plaintiff class presented
expert testimony to prove that MPS systemically violated the IDEA. 93 The
defendants presented expert testimony establishing that its policies and
practices concerning Child Find complied with the IDEA and that all
violations alleged by the plaintiffs were not systemic violations.94 Upon the
conclusion of Phase I, the court advised the parties of its reactions to the
testimony and exhibits.95 The court stated that it found the plaintiffs‘ experts
more persuasive than the defendants‘ experts.96
Phase II consisted of factual presentations of forty-eight witnesses on
which the experts formed their respective opinions. 97 In this phase of the trial,
the plaintiffs presented testimony of certain members of the plaintiff class and
illustrated how MPS violated Child Find in each instance. 98 Testimony from
the plaintiff class presented ―the reality underlying the foregoing conclusions
of the experts.‖99 For example, plaintiff Melanie V. was a good student until
fourth grade.100 In fifth grade, she began missing school a lot and felt she was
―not herself.‖101 Melanie failed the sixth grade. 102 During her repeat year, her
grades did not improve, she wrote notes about killing herself, and she was

91. Id. at 882 (quoting Doe v. Ariz. Dep‘t of Educ., 111 F.3d 678, 682 (9th Cir. 1997)).
92. Id. at 872.
93. Id. at 883.
94. Id. at 885–86.
95. Id. at 883.
96. Id. The plaintiffs presented the testimony of Dr. Diana Rogers Adkinson, an expert in the
field of special education. Id. Dr. Adkinson engaged in a quantitative analysis to ascertain Child
Find patterns and trends and projected her findings to all of MPS. Id. at 884. Specifically, Dr.
Adkinson opined, ―MPS engaged in a pattern of suspending students as a way of coping with the
discipline and behavioral problems of students.‖ Id. at 885. The court accepted her analysis
methodology, the Child Find trends, and their application to MPS. Id. at 884–85. The court also
noted, and found significant, that MPS failed to produce any evidence to rebut Dr. Adkinson‘s
findings. Id. at 883–84. As a result, ―there [was] no compelling reason not to accept the findings of
Dr. Rogers Adkinson.‖ Id. at 884.
97. Id. at 872.
98. Id. at 889–97.
99. Id. at 889.
100. Id. at 890.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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suspended for possessing a razor blade at school.103 Melanie was sent to the
Milwaukee County Mental Health Complex three times in one semester. 104 At
this time, MPS conducted a hearing and the school principal forced Melanie
to enroll in a different school; she did not receive a special education
referral.105 Finally, almost two years after Melanie‘s problems began, she
received a special education evaluation upon her mother‘s request. 106 Melanie
was determined to be eligible for special education. 107 The plaintiffs
presented this testimony to demonstrate MPS‘s violation of the identification
aspect of Child Find.108
In Phase III of the trial, the plaintiffs and MPS presented evidence on the
most appropriate remedies and sanctions for MPS‘s systemic violations of
Child Find.109 DPI did not participate in this phase of the litigation because it
entered into a settlement agreement with the plaintiffs.110 This phase of the
litigation was the most important of the three, as the effectiveness of the
remedy will have a significant impact on MPS‘s ability to achieve satisfactory
compliance with the IDEA.
Upon completion of Phases I and II of the trial, the court concluded that
MPS violated the IDEA and related state statutes.111 These violations
included a failure to comply with Child Find. 112 ―MPS failed to adequately
identify, locate and evaluate children with disabilities in need of special
education and related services. . . . [T]he violations of MPS during this
period . . . were systemic in nature and thus violated the rights of the plaintiff
class.‖113 The court found that MPS violated the rights of the individual
plaintiffs, and as a result of the systemic violations, MPS also violated the
rights of the plaintiff class.114 More specifically, the court concluded that
MPS systemically violated the Child Find mandate in four specific ways. 115
First, MPS failed to refer children with a suspected disability in a timely
manner for an initial evaluation. 116 Initial evaluations are timely when they
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 889–90.
109. See id. at 904; infra Part V.
110. See Settlement Agreement, Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., No. 01-C-928 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 27, 2008).
111. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 903.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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occur within ninety days of the student‘s referral. 117 Evidence showed that
from June 2000 to June 2003, 9.9% of all initial evaluations were not
conducted within the ninety-day time period after referral.118 Additionally,
many cases were marked closed without reason prior to conducting an
evaluation on the child.119
Second, MPS improperly extended the ninety-day time requirement. 120
Extensions of this time requirement may be granted under special
circumstances.121 An extension is appropriate when a child enrolls in a new
school after the ninety-day evaluation period has begun and before the child‘s
previous school has determined whether the child has a disability.122 The new
school must show it is making sufficient progress to ensure the evaluation is
completed, and determine with the child‘s parent or parents a specific time
when the evaluation will be completed. 123 An extension may also be
appropriate if the ―child‘s parent repeatedly fails or refuses to produce the
child for the evaluation.‖124 MPS demonstrated a pattern of improperly
extending its ninety-day deadline. 125 This was largely due to the fact that
MPS did not conduct any evaluations during the summer months, often
waiting until October of the following school year.126 This is an improper
extension of the ninety-day evaluation period.127
Third, MPS suspended students in a manner that impeded its ability to
refer children with suspected disabilities for an initial evaluation. 128
Suspensions are indicative of a child having a disability when combined with
other behavior by the child that also suggest a disability is present. 129 This
pattern of behavior should alert a district to suspect a disability, thus
triggering the Child Find duty to refer the child for an evaluation. 130 MPS
systemically failed to complete this task. 131 For example, one plaintiff

117. Id. at 881. The IDEA and related Wisconsin statutes now require that evaluations take
place within sixty days. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(i)(I) (2006) (effective July 1, 2005); WIS. STAT.
§ 115.78(3)(a) (2007–2008).
118. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 895.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 897.
121. WIS. STAT. § 115.78(3)(b)(1)–(2) (2007–2008).
122. Id. § 115.78(3)(b)(1).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 884–85.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 885.
128. Id. at 896.
129. Id. at 898.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 903.
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received forty-four suspensions in first and second grade and fell below the
school‘s academic standards.132 MPS students in this situation were regularly
―subject to discipline and suspensions instead of being promptly referred for
special education.‖133 This is a clear violation of the IDEA, as it should alert a
teacher that a referral is necessary.134
Fourth, MPS failed to ensure parent or guardian participation at the initial
evaluation.135 The IDEA requires parents of a child with a disability to be part
of the IEP team.136 The school district is required to provide the parent with a
meaningful opportunity to attend all meetings regarding their child‘s
identification, evaluation, and placement. 137 The school must notify parents
early enough to ensure their opportunity to attend. 138 Decisions regarding the
identification, evaluation, and placement of the child can be made in the
absence of the parent, but only when the school can document its reasonable
efforts to notify the parent.139 Plaintiff Jamie S.‘s mother repeatedly requested
her daughter be evaluated for special education services. 140 Finally, Jamie
was tested for a disability after exhibiting cognitive delays for more than four
years; however, MPS did not attempt to notify Jamie‘s mother of her
daughter‘s IEP meeting.141 As a result, she was unable to participate in any
way in her daughter‘s special education program. 142
Although not a specific violation of Child Find, the court noted that
MPS‘s procedure to ensure that all children with disabilities are identified and
located was inadequate. 143 MPS informed the public about its special
education programs by disseminating a handbook at the beginning of each
school year to parents with children enrolled in the MPS district.144 Upon
request, MPS also sent Child Find information to community organizations
and area clinics. 145 ―Even though MPS tries to get the word out about its

132. See id. at 896.
133. Id.
134. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(B) (2006) (mandating that students with disabilities may be
suspended for not more than ten days).
135. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 903.
136. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
137. BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 11, at 25; see also Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005)
(acknowledging that parents are to play a ―significant role‖ in the special education process).
138. BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 11, at 25.
139. Id.
140. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 891.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 893.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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special education services, it is still missing too many children with needs.‖ 146
Expert Dr. Diana Rogers Adkinson estimated that MPS missed hundreds of
students with disabilities.147 Disseminating information is required to comply
with Child Find; 148 however, if the school district is not identifying and
locating all children with disabilities by disseminating information, then
something more is required to meet this goal. 149 MPS failed to implement
other methods to achieve compliance with Child Find.150
The court noted that throughout this period, 151 MPS was aware of its
duties under Child Find and acknowledged that MPS made efforts to
discharge these responsibilities. 152 Its efforts, while made in good faith, were
inadequate. 153
IV. URBAN CHALLENGES: WHY MPS VIOLATED CHILD FIND
In light of all of the facts in Jamie S., the court‘s holding that MPS
violated Child Find was undoubtedly the correct decision. The circumstances
of the members of the class of plaintiffs clearly supported each systemic
violation found by the court. 154 What the court did not address in its opinion
was what went wrong in the MPS district. MPS‘s policies and procedures
would likely achieve full compliance with Child Find in other school districts,
but for MPS they were wholly inadequate.155 The court stated that MPS‘s
efforts to comply with the IDEA were made in good faith, but the district still
came up short.156 So what went wrong? Why did MPS‘s method of locating,
identifying, and evaluating students with disabilities systemically violate its
Child Find duties under the IDEA? The systemic failures of MPS are
attributable to the unique challenges faced by urban school districts like the
MPS district.157

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. The time period under consideration during the trial was from September 2000 to June
2005. Id. at 872.
152. Id. at 903–04.
153. Id. at 904.
154. See id. at 889–99.
155. See Doe v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch., 9 F. App‘x 453, 456 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that
the distribution of informational material to area schools, agencies, and professionals who encounter
children with disabilities brought this school district in compliance with Child Find).
156. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
157. SNIPES ET AL., supra note 86, at 21–29; Heise, supra note 86, at 1419–24.

872

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:857

Some argue that ―[t]he appalling outcomes in urban schools are arguably
the most pronounced social policy problem facing leaders today.‖158 Many
urban districts acknowledge a simple fact: academic performance is
unsatisfactory. 159 The MPS district is no exception; Milwaukee public
schools are labeled as ―failing.‖160 The minority population represents a
majority of the students. In the 2007–2008 school year 87.6% of the student
population was non-white. 161 The enrollment of white students has
consistently declined over the last ten years.162 The number of students who
qualify for free or reduced lunch is the most reliable indicator of how many
students are from low-income families. Seventy-seven percent of students in
MPS qualified for free or reduced lunch. 163 Individually, 60 of the district‘s
213 schools had rates over 90%, and about half of the district‘s schools had
rates over 80%. 164 Stark academic achievement gaps for low-income and
minority students remain a defining feature of urban school districts. 165 It is
no surprise that since the majority of MPS consists of low-income and
minority students there is a significant achievement gap between the MPS
district and the rest of the state.
The following statistics demonstrate just how wide the achievement gap
the district faces is. In the 2007–2008 school year, only 60% of third graders
in the MPS district were reading at a proficient level. 166 Even worse, reading
proficiency fell to 38% in the tenth grade. 167 A much more impressive 75% of
tenth graders in the remainder of the state of Wisconsin were reading at a

158. Andrew J. Rotherham & Sara Mead, A New Deal for Urban Public Schools, HARV. L. &
POL‘Y REV. ONLINE, http://www.hlpronline.com/2007/04/rotherham_mead_01.html (last visited
May 26, 2009).
159. SNIPES ET AL., supra note 86, at 21.
160. DENNIS W. REDOVICH, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF JOBS & EDUC. IN WIS. & THE U.S., THE
WAR AGAINST THE MILWAUKEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 4 (2004). There has been a steady achievement
gap between MPS and the state over the last four years. See DIV. OF RESEARCH & ASSESSMENT,
MILWAUKEE PUB. SCH. 2007–2008 DISTRICT REPORT CARD 12 chart 14 (2008), available at
http://www2.milwaukee.k12.wi.us/acctrep/0708/2008_district.pdf [hereinafter DISTRICT REPORT
CARD]. Overall, many of the MPS‘s 218 schools are ―making little headway in changing their status
among Wisconsin‘s worst performing schools.‖ Alan J. Borsuk, Suspension Rate Deemed Too High:
MPS Superintendent Seeks Alternatives in Minor Matters, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 7, 2008, at
1B.
161. See DISTRICT REPORT CARD, supra note 160, at 6 chart 3.
162. Id. at 5.
163. Id. at 8 chart 9.
164. Id. at 8.
165. JASON SNIPES & AMANDA HORWITZ, COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCH., RESEARCH
BRIEF: RECRUITING AND RETAINING EFFECTIVE TEACHERS IN URBAN SCHOOLS 1 (2007), available
at http://www.cgcs.org/publications/TQ_Brief_final.pdf.
166. DISTRICT REPORT CARD, supra note 160, at 12 chart 14.
167. Id.
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proficient level in 2007–2008.168 Similar trends follow for mathematics. 169
MPS as a whole has a 42% proficiency rate in math, compared to the state‘s
74% proficiency in math. 170
―A key measure of school performance is the percent of students
graduating from high school.‖171 The most recent statistics show that the state
of Wisconsin had a 91% graduation rate, while the MPS district had a 69%
graduation rate.172 To put these numbers in perspective, it is important to note
that the state target is an 80% graduation rate. 173 Another important measure
of school performance is habitual truancy. More than 75% of high school
students and nearly 50% of all students in the MPS district are habitually
truant.174 ―[A]n average of 4,000 MPS students [are] unexcused and absent on
any given school day.‖175 MPS also has a high incidence of poverty and
unwed pregnancies. 176 These characteristics are typical of almost all urban
school districts.177
These statistics make it clear that the characteristics of the students
themselves create many challenges that suburban schools do not face, or face
on a much less serious level. 178 However, challenges to urban districts like
MPS go much deeper than student demographics; challenges are engrained in
168. See id.
169. See COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCH., BEATING THE ODDS: ASSESSMENT RESULTS
FROM THE 2005–2006 SCHOOL YEAR 279–80 (2006); DISTRICT REPORT CARD, supra note 160, at
12.
170. DISTRICT REPORT CARD, supra note 160, at 17 chart 21.
171. Id. at 28.
172. Id. at 29 chart 45. For older statistics on graduation rates, see WIS. DEP‘T OF PUB.
INSTRUCTION, WISCONSIN SCHOOL PERFORMANCE REPORT, available at http://dpi.state.wi.us/spr/
xls/grad03.xls.
173. DISTRICT REPORT CARD, supra note 160, at 28.
174. Id. at 25 chart 37. A habitual truant is defined as ―a pupil who is absent from school
without an acceptable excuse . . . for part or all of 5 or more days on which school is held during a
school semester.‖ WIS. STAT. § 118.16(1)(a) (2007–2008).
175. Dani McClain, Alderman Calls MPS Truancy Efforts “B-R-O-K-E-N,” MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL ONLINE, News and Opinion Blogs, http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/31984204.html
(Sept. 15, 2008). ―Perhaps the most alarming case in the district is Custer High School, where the
chronic truancy rate was 98% two years in a row.‖ Dani McClain, Half of MPS Students Regularly
Skip School, Report Shows, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 12, 2008, at A1.
176. George Lightbourn, Milwaukee Public Schools: A City’s Lost Economic Promise, 13 WIS.
INT. 13, 14 (2004).
177. Id.
178. See WIS. DEP‘T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, SPECIAL EDUCATION DISTRICT PROFILE :
MILWAUKEE SCHOOL DISTRICT (2006–2007), available at https://www2.dpi.state.wi.us/District
Profile/Pages/DistrictProfile.aspx (select ―Milwaukee Sch. Dist.‖ and ―2006–2007‖ from the drop
down menus) [hereinafter SPECIAL EDUCATION DISTRICT PROFILE] (reporting that the Milwaukee
School District had lower graduation rates, higher dropout rates, more suspensions and expulsions,
and lower proficiency rates in all subject areas for students receiving special education when
compared to the State of Wisconsin).
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the school system itself. 179 For example, most urban schools are plagued by
low expectations of students and lack a demanding curriculum. 180 In a case
study of several urban school systems, in each district teachers reported
feeling ―overwhelmed . . . by the substantial challenges faced by many of their
lower-income and minority students.‖181 This led the staff to lower their
expectations of achievement for these students. 182
Low expectations and low standards may be affecting Child Find efforts
in MPS because students who have disabilities may be meeting the academic
standards of the classroom only because standards are so low. 183 In a
classroom with higher expectations, these students may fail academically, and
consequently, teachers or parents could identify earlier those who are failing
as the result of a suspected disability. While low standards are a problem for
all students in urban districts, they are a particularly severe problem for
students with disabilities. 184 ―The importance of early identification . . . for
any child who may have special educational needs cannot be overemphasized. The earlier action is taken, the more responsive the child is
likely to be.‖185
Special education teaches students with disabilities ways to cope with
their impairments and identifies accommodations that make educational
success more likely. If students with disabilities never receive special
education services, they are not learning ways to succeed in the workforce
despite having disabilities. A school district‘s sub-par standards may conceal
students‘ disabilities because even students with learning impairments may be
capable of reaching such low standards. As soon as these children leave the
school district by graduating or dropping out of high school, they will be
faced with average expectations, which are much higher than the low
standards of their school district. This is likely when a disability will present
itself—when it is too late to receive special education services. Students with
disabilities who never receive special education are likely to develop
179. WIS. DEP‘T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, ADEQUATE YEARLY PROGRESS REVIEW SUMMARY :
MILWAUKEE SCHOOL DISTRICT (2007), available at http://www2.dpi.state.wi.us/sifi/ayp_summary.
asp?year=2007&districtcd=3619 (finding that reading and mathematics in the Milwaukee School
District were at unsatisfactory levels and did not meet adequate yearly progress).
180. SNIPES ET AL., supra note 86, at 25.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. See SPECIAL EDUCATION DISTRICT PROFILE, supra note 178 (reporting statistics that
show the students that are identified as having disabilities in the Milwaukee School District are
significantly less proficient in reading and math than students with disabilities in the rest of the State
of Wisconsin).
185. WILSON, supra note 74, at 158 (quoting CODE OF PRACTICE ON THE IDENTIFICATION &
ASSESSMENT OF SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 10 (1994)).
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secondary handicaps and function at a level well below average learning and
development.186 Additionally, students with disabilities who are never
formally diagnosed are doomed for failure in light of the fact that the largest
achievement gap among all student subgroups is between students with
disabilities (those who actually participate in special education) and general
education students.187 Although there are no statistics to prove it, it is logical
to assume that the achievement gap between students with disabilities who
never receive special education and general education students is even wider.
There are often high rates of student mobility in urban districts. 188 This is
especially problematic in Milwaukee where public school choice is available
to all students.189 In MPS, one of every five high school students transfers to
another school during the year.190 ―Schools that receive large numbers of new
students during the school year often experience greater academic challenges
in serving these students.‖191 Greater academic challenges result in part from
inconsistent instructional strategies. Undoubtedly, every teacher and school
approaches the curriculum differently; thus, when a student jumps from
school to school constantly switching teachers, this creates inconsistencies
that negatively affect student learning.192 Also, it takes time for a teacher to
become familiar with a student‘s style of learning. When faced with a new
student, the teacher is unfamiliar with the student‘s typical level of
achievement and as a result, it may take the full school year, possibly longer,
to recognize whether a particular student is over or under-achieving relative to
past performances.193
There is high teacher mobility in urban school districts as well. 194 Overall,
―[t]hirty-three percent of new teachers leave teaching within the first three
years.‖195 This trend is even more severe in urban school districts. The
186. Id.
187. DISTRICT REPORT CARD, supra note 160, at 16.
188. SNIPES ET AL., supra note 86, at 26; SNIPES & HORWITZ, supra note 165, at 3.
189. Public school choice allows parents to ―list up to three schools they would like their
children to attend.‖ DAVID DODENHOFF, WIS. POLICY RESEARCH INST., FIXING THE MILWAUKEE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE LIMITS OF PARENT-DRIVEN REFORM 5 (2007). In 2006, almost 17,000
parents utilized their school choice rights, and nearly 95% of parents received their first choice
school. Id. The theory behind school choice is that the more parents who exercise their option to
choose, the more the education system will operate like a marketplace, which will positively impact
school improvement and student achievement. Id. at 4. However, estimates of only about 10% of
MPS parents are utilizing school choice by actively choosing a school, choosing between two or
more schools, and considering academic factors in their choice. Id. at 8–9.
190. DISTRICT REPORT CARD, supra note 160, at 9 chart 12.
191. Id. at 9.
192. SNIPES ET AL., supra note 86, at 26.
193. See SNIPES & HORWITZ, supra note 165, at 2.
194. Id. at 4.
195. Id.
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turnover rate of teachers in high-poverty, urban schools is 70% higher than in
school districts with low-poverty rates.196 Even more troubling is the fact that
the most effective teachers are also the most likely to leave the profession.
Research shows that the most academically qualified teachers and those who
work in ―hard-to-staff‖ areas, meaning those who work with high
concentrations of disadvantaged children, are the most likely to leave. 197
Urban school districts have become ―training grounds‖ for inexperienced
teachers who then move out of the district and on to more affluent and less
troubled areas as soon as they can.198
High teacher and student mobility is particularly problematic in achieving
Child Find compliance. A large portion of identification of students with
disabilities comes from teacher referrals.199 This is because the classroom
teachers spend the most time with the students and are the most familiar with
a student‘s academic ability and achievement. This dependency on teacher
referrals is even greater in urban school districts because of decreased parental
involvement. 200
If students and teachers are constantly moving in and out of school
districts, they are unable to develop a meaningful classroom relationship. 201
Teachers struggle to keep track of the students in their classrooms and
consequently are unable to identify and refer students with disabilities for
evaluations because they are unfamiliar with the student‘s typical level of
achievement. Tracking a student‘s progress from year to year is the most
reliable way for a teacher to recognize a student with a disability. 202 It is
extremely difficult to track a student if the student is hopping from school to
196. Id. For example, ―[i]n New York City, only 28[%] of teachers were teaching in the same
school after five years, compared with 43[%] of teachers in suburban schools throughout New York
State.‖ Id.
197. U.S. DEP‘T OF EDUC., ATTRACTING, DEVELOPING AND RETAINING EFFECTIVE
TEACHERS: BACKGROUND REPORT FOR THE UNITED STATES 50 (2004), available at
http://www.nctq.org/p/publications/docs/us_bkgrd_reprt_20071129024238.pdf.
198. SNIPES & HORWITZ, supra note 165, at 9; U.S. DEP‘T OF EDUC., supra note 197, at 52 (―A
recent study of nearly 400,000 teachers . . . found that teachers who choose to change districts are
more likely to take a job where there are fewer minorities, lower poverty rates and higher student
achievement.‖).
199. ROGER PIERANGELO & GEORGE GIULIANI, 100 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT
THE SPECIAL EDUCATION PROCESS 22 (2007); see Eve Joan Kelemen Lohnas, Assessing Learning
Handicapped Student Performance Through Time-Series Analysis of Curriculum-Based
Measurement Techniques: Monte Carlo Simulation Study (Dec. 1988) 149 (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara) (on file with author) (finding support for the
previous theory that a teacher‘s decision to refer a student is the central factor in special education
placement).
200. DODENHOFF, supra note 189, at 1.
201. See SNIPES ET AL., supra note 86, at 26.
202. Kelemen Lohnas, supra note 199, at 149–50 (finding that the best predictor of referral was
the teacher‘s evaluation of the student‘s ability to perform).
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school, especially in a school district with a large student population. 203 Thus,
with increased dependency on teacher referrals and high student and teacher
mobility inhibiting a meaningful relationship, many students likely go
unidentified as having, or suspected of having, a disability. 204 This can
profoundly affect a school district‘s level of compliance with Child Find.
As stated above, teachers are a large source of special education
referrals.205 Through frequent referrals of their own children for evaluations,
parents also play a significant role in discharging a school‘s Child Find
duties. 206 Additionally, the school district needs a parent‘s or guardian‘s
consent for an evaluation. 207 Thus, a non-responsive parent can halt the
diagnostic process despite the existence of a referral for an evaluation. This
becomes problematic in urban school districts because parents are less
involved in their child‘s education.208 Many parents of students in MPS are
considered ―disadvantaged.‖209 The disadvantaged include minority and
single parents and those with limited income, education, or English-language
proficiency.210 Overall, all of these categories are indicators of decreased
parental involvement in their child‘s education and MPS‘s ―numbers are
substantially less favorable than those in the U.S. at large.‖211 In the MPS
district, only 11% of parents of fourteen- through seventeen-year-olds are
actively involved both at school and at home. 212
Parents with children in urban school districts are much less likely to refer
their children for special education evaluations because this would require
involvement in their child‘s education. 213 This involvement would include a
parent monitoring his or her child‘s academic progress, speaking with a
teacher or administrator to request an evaluation, and explaining exactly why
the parent suspects his or her child of having a disability. Parental
involvement of this type is unlikely in urban districts. 214 Thus, a large referral
203. MPS‘s total student enrollment in the 2008–2009 school year was 85,369. DISTRICT
REPORT CARD, supra note 160, at 5 chart 1.
204. See Kelemen Lohnas, supra note 199, at 149.
205. Id. at 149–50.
206. PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 199, at 22.
207. 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(a)(1)(i) (2008).
208. DODENHOFF, supra note 189, at 6.
209. Id.
210. See id.
211. Id. at tbl.1 (reporting 55% minorities, 18.5% of families with children are living below the
poverty line, 19% of parents speak languages other than English, 58% are single-parent families, and
20% of adults have less than a high school diploma).
212. Id. at 2 (reporting on parental involvement of children in the fourteen- to seventeen-yearold age group).
213. See id. at 6.
214. See id. at 2.

878

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:857

source is severely decreased or eliminated, making compliance with Child
Find even more difficult because this burden shifts to the school district. It is
unlikely that teacher referrals are picking up all the slack, and as a result,
many students are not referred and go unevaluated.
A final, and likely the most significant, contributor to MPS‘s systemic
violation of Child Find is the myriad of issues and needs faced by the
district.215 Urban school districts, like the students they educate, do not face
one or two challenges but a constellation of barriers to effectively educating
students with and without disabilities. 216 In addition to the issues mentioned
above—widening achievement gap, high student and teacher mobility, and
decreased parental involvement—further challenges include budget
constraints, deteriorating facilities, decreased public confidence, and negative
racial attitudes.217 In a recent survey, all of America‘s major urban public
school systems were asked to identify what they believed to be the most
pressing needs faced by their urban district.218 Special education needs were
ranked twenty-third out of forty-three listed.219 This report demonstrates that
while special education is among the most pressing needs, it is nowhere near
the top of any school district‘s priority list.220 It is probable that this is the key
problem MPS faces in its failed efforts to comply with Child Find. 221 If
compliance with Child Find was the only problem MPS faced, it likely would
have implemented a reform strategy and improved its compliance. 222
However, if leaders in the district do not make compliance with Child Find a
top priority, no reform or improvement strategies will be implemented, and
children will remain without special education services.

215. JASON SNIPES ET AL., COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCH., CRITICAL TRENDS IN URBAN
EDUCATION : SIXTH SURVEY OF AMERICA‘S GREAT CITY SCHOOLS 5–6 fig.4 (2006) available at
http://www.cgcs.org/pdfs/06_07AR.pdf.
216. See Rotherham & Mead, supra note 158.
217. See generally SNIPES ET AL., supra note 86.
218. SNIPES ET AL., supra note 215, at 5–6 fig.4.
219. Id. at 6 fig.4.
220. Id. For example, MPS recently spent $27,144 to purchase iPods to try and attract more
students to eat the free breakfast offered at school. Charlie Sykes, Sykes Writes, IPODS?, available
at http://www.620wtmj.com/shows/charliesykes/35058319.html (Nov. 25, 2008). In the midst of
pending class action litigation the district would have been wise to spend its money on improving its
Child Find procedures instead. This type of frivolous spending does little to send the message to the
plaintiff class that it is making serious efforts to reform the special education procedures to ensure
future compliance with the IDEA.
221. SNIPES ET AL., supra note 215, at 5–6 fig.4.
222. See id. at 11 (finding that current reforms and improvement strategies are making a
difference in school systems).
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V. PHASE III: REMEDIES AND SANCTIONS
Finally, the court addressed the issue of remedies and sanctions in Phase
III of the trial.223 At the end of its decision in Phase II of the trial, the court
encouraged the parties to renew settlement efforts to try to reach a mutually
agreeable solution regarding remedies and sanctions.224 The court was very
clear in its desire to avoid a court-imposed resolution in order to expedite the
process and curtail litigation costs. 225 DPI took seriously Judge Goodstein‘s
open endorsement of negotiating a mutually agreeable settlement to avoid
further litigation costs.226 Unfortunately, MPS did not take his words to heart.
On November 6, 2008, more than seven years after the plaintiffs filed the
complaint in this case Phase III of the trial began. 227
A. DPI’s Settlement
The plaintiff class and DPI reached a settlement agreement of which the
court approved. 228 Although DPI as a party defendant was not the focus of
this Note, the terms of its settlement agreement will have a significant impact
on the plaintiff class and all other students eligible for special education in
MPS. The agreement awarded the plaintiffs declaratory and injunctive relief;
aside from attorneys‘ fees, the plaintiffs did not seek any money damages. 229
The highlights of the agreement include the following:
1. Dr. W. Alan Coulter was appointed as an independent outside expert
funded by DPI to monitor MPS to ensure compliance with its federal and state
special education obligations.230
2. The independent expert must conduct a review policy and procedures
in MPS and conduct a needs assessment regarding Child Find. The expert
will oversee the creation of a compliance plan to achieve performance
standards in the MPS district and have the authority to ensure that those
standards are met.231
3. The parties established a compliance plan and measurable outcome
standards for MPS‘s future performance with respect to timely initial
223. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 519 F. Supp. 2d 870, 904 (E.D. Wis. 2007).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See id. (encouraging the parties to settle); see also Settlement Agreement, supra note 110
(DPI settles.)
227. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., No. 01-C-928 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 29, 2008) (scheduling
order).
228. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., No. 01-C-928 (E.D. Wis. July 28, 2008) (order granting
approval of class settlement).
229. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 110, at exhibit A.
230. Id. at 7–12.
231. Id.
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evaluations, parental participation in IEP meetings, referral of students who
reach a set number of suspensions in a school year to an early intervention
programs that will address the student‘s academic or behavior issues, and
referral of students who are retained in a given school year to the early
intervention program. 232
4. DPI agreed to order MPS to provide training to staff on indicators of
special education needs, referral procedures, and Child Find obligations. 233
5. The creation of a parent trainer position funded by DPI housed at
F.A.C.E.T.S.234 to provide training and support to MPS parents. 235
6. Finally, DPI agreed to pay $475,000 in attorneys‘ fees to the plaintiff‘s
counsel.236
In response to the settlement agreement, State Superintendent Elizabeth
Burmaster stated that ―[b]y settling this long standing lawsuit, [DPI] can
continue moving forward in building successful learning experiences for all
students in MPS. . . . [W]e are getting back to serving the needs of all MPS
students in the classroom, instead of continuing to debate the issues in the
court room.‖237
B. Urban Remedies: Bringing MPS into Satisfactory Compliance with the
IDEA
As of the date of publication of this Note, the parties litigated and briefed
the remedies portion of the trial; 238 however, due to the complexity of the case
the court had not yet issued its decision. In cases like Jamie S., brought under
the IDEA, a court is empowered to ―grant such relief as the court determines
232. Id. at 4–7.
233. Id. at 13.
234. See Wisconsin Family Assistance Center for Education, Training and Support,
http://www.wifacets.org/programs09.html (last visited May 26, 2009). F.A.C.E.T.S. is an acronym
for the Wisconsin Family Assistance Center for Education, Training and Support, Inc., which is a
nonprofit organization serving Wisconsin children and adults with disabilities, their families, and
those who support them. Id.
235. The settlement agreement states that the parent trainer position will not exceed an annual
cost of $75,000 and the total cost is not to exceed $300,000. Settlement Agreement, supra note 110,
at 13.
236. Id. at 18.
237. Press Release, Wis. Dep‘t of Pub. Instruction, DPI, DRW and DPI Agree to Special
Education Lawsuit Settlement, MPS Has Not Reached an Agreement (Apr. 7, 2008), available at
http://dpi.wi.gov/eis/pdf/dpi2008_64.pdf.
238. The evidentiary portion of Phase III commenced on November 6, 2008, and concluded on
November 14, 2008. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., No. 01-C-928 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 29, 2008)
(scheduling order). At the close of trial, the court established a post-hearing briefing schedule and
requested that the parties address certain questions in their post-trial briefs. The post-hearing briefing
closed on February 9, 2009. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., No. 01-C-928 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 17,
2008) (post-Phase III scheduling order).
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is appropriate.‖239 Courts have the authority ―to impose a broad range of
equitable remedies.‖240 As a result, it is difficult to speculate about what
remedies the court will impose because it has such broad discretion. There is,
however, a large body of case law that provides some guidance as to what
remedies courts typically impose upon finding a violation of the IDEA. 241
However, if the court in this case imposes a generic remedy dictated by case
law, it will almost surely prove unsuccessful. The key to remedying MPS‘s
systemic Child Find violations is a remedy that is carefully tailored to MPS‘s
unique urban challenges. Further, a court must be willing to hold MPS, and
other urban school districts, to a standard of substantial compliance instead of

239. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006).
240. NORLIN, supra note 7, at 15.
241. By the time this Note is published, the court likely will have issued its decision of Phase
III of the trial. Thus, an in-depth discussion speculating what remedies the court may impose will
likely be a moot one. However, a brief overview of the remedies available under the IDEA may
provide useful background information to help put the court‘s decision into context.
Since 1975, there have been steady increases in the relief awarded to children with disabilities
under the IDEA. Stephen C. Shannon, Note, The Individuals With Disabilities Education Act:
Determining “Appropriate Relief” in a Post-Gwinnett Era, 85 VA. L. REV. 853, 854 (1999). The
most traditional form of relief for FAPE violations, which would include MPS‘s Child Find
violation, is injunctive relief in the form of ordering an appropriate placement for a child or
developing an appropriate IEP for the student. Taylor v. Honig, 910 F.2d 627, 628 (9th Cir. 1990) ;
Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 979 (8th Cir. 1982); Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205,
1211–12 (7th Cir. 1981). One court noted that this form of injunctive relief is the most consistent
with the goals of the IDEA, which explains why many courts are comfortable awarding this type of
relief. See Marvin H. v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 714 F.2d 1348, 1356 (5th Cir. 1983).
Compensatory education is another possible remedy that awards extra educational services
beyond the services normally due to a student under state law. MITCHELL L. YELL, THE LAW AND
SPECIAL EDUCATION 366–67 (2d ed. 2006). This remedy is designed to make up for students‘ lost
progress because of previous denials of FAPE. Id. As a result, compensatory education typically
extends a student‘s eligibility for educational services beyond age twenty-one. Id. at 367.
Tuition reimbursement is another available remedy and is commonly awarded to compensate
parents for the costs of placing their child in a private school as a result of the public school failing to
provide their child a FAPE. Id. at 363. This remedy is appropriate only when parents can afford to
place their child in a private school. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006). However, when
parents cannot afford to place their children in private schools, awarding compensatory education is a
more appropriate remedy. Meiner v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 1986).
Retroactive tuition reimbursement is one of the few codified remedies included in the IDEA.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). Although not included in the original text of the law, reimbursement
has been determined appropriate in cases where the school district fails to conduct ―sufficient ‗childfind‘‖ activities or upon finding ―sufficiently serious procedural failures.‖ Doe v. Metro. Nashville
Pub. Sch., 133 F.3d 384, 388 (6th Cir. 1998) (reversing on other grounds). Courts have recognized
other forms of reimbursement as remedies for Child Find violations as well. For example, in
Department of Education v. Cari Rae S., the school district was required to reimburse the plaintiffs
for hospitalization costs incurred as a result of an especially egregious Child Find violation. See 158
F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1200 (D. Haw. 2001).
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100% compliance. Only this will facilitate MPS in meeting its Child Find
duties. 242
As they did in their settlement with DPI, the plaintiffs sought only
declaratory and injunctive relief; the only money damages sought are
attorney‘s fees and costs.243 The plaintiffs filed a motion seeking interim
attorney‘s fees and costs incurred from the beginning of litigation through the
end of September 2007.244 The IDEA codifies attorney‘s fees as an
appropriate remedy for the ―prevailing party.‖245 The prevailing party seeking
the attorney‘s fees must secure a judgment on the merits of at least some of
the party‘s claims. 246 Further, interim attorney‘s fees are appropriate ―once a
plaintiff obtains substantive relief that is not defeasible by further
proceedings.‖247 The defendants‘ potential liability for attorney‘s fees is
extremely important in a case like this where the ―potential liability for
fees . . . can be as significant as, and sometimes even more significant than,
their potential liability on the merits.‖248
In their motion for interim attorney‘s fees and costs the plaintiffs sought
―$1,200,891.32 in attorneys‘ fees and $119,007.57 in costs incurred through
the end of September 2007.‖249 In Jamie S., the court decided the question of
liability when it issued its decision and order in Phase II of the trial. 250 It is
242. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111 (2008).
243. Settlement Agreement, supra note 110, at exhibit A; Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Bd. Sch.
Dirs., No. 1-C-928, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66447, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 15, 2008).
244. Jamie S., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66447, at *5. The plaintiffs likely will recover the
remaining attorney‘s fees and costs upon the court‘s issuance of its decision of Phase III of the trial.
245. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).
246. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep‘t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 603 (2001) (quoting Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980)).
247. Jamie S., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66447, at *4 (quoting Dupuy v. Samuels, 423 F.3d 714,
719 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
248. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 734 (1986). This is true because attorney‘s fees are likely
the only form of monetary compensation the parents of the students will receive. Only in
―exceptional situations‖ are parents entitled to monetary damages. Pamela Wright & Peter Wright,
Class Action Lawsuit: Judge Orders Sanctions Against School District, Remedies for Kids,
WRIGHTSLAW, Oct. 14, 2007, http://www.wrightslaw.com/law/art/wi.jamie.mps/wdpi.htm; see, e.g.,
W.B. v. Matula, 63 F.3d 484, 495 (3d Cir. 1995) (awarding monetary damages but cautioning lower
courts that compensatory damages may be an inferior remedy to compensatory education or tuition
reimbursement). Many courts have determined that monetary damages are not available to parents
because that type of remedy does not further the goal of providing education for students with
disabilities. See, e.g., Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1213 (7th Cir. 1981) (determining that
educational programs would suffer if school officials hesitated to implement educational reforms for
fear of exposing themselves to monetary liability and this would ultimately ―hinder rather than help
the very children for whose benefit [EAHCA] was enacted‖). As previously noted, the plaintiff class
did not seek any monetary damages other than attorney‘s fees. Settlement Agreement, supra note
110, at exhibit A.
249. Jamie S., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66447, at *5.
250. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 519 F. Supp. 2d 870, 903 (E.D. Wis. 2007).
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clear that the ―plaintiffs have prevailed. There is nothing that could be
reasonably expected to occur in Phase III that would remove such status from
the plaintiffs.‖251 Thus, the court granted the plaintiffs‘ motion for interim
attorney‘s fees but made several reductions to the original amount the
plaintiffs‘ requested.252 The court awarded a total of $934,123.96 in interim
attorneys‘ fees.253 After subtracting the $475,000 that DPI agreed to pay in its
settlement with the plaintiffs,254 MPS‘s total obligation was $459,123.96.255
The court denied the plaintiffs‘ request for costs because the district‘s
local rules explicitly state that costs are not recoverable until after the entry of
a judgment. 256 Thus, the court denied the plaintiffs‘ request for costs without
prejudice as the any amount awarded is premature until a judgment is
entered.257
It is reasonable to anticipate that MPS will take the position that it should
not have been found liable and should not be sanctioned or ordered to engage
in widespread remedial efforts within the school system because of the
extraordinary challenges MPS faced and continues to face as a result of being
an urban district and because its efforts to comply with the IDEA were made
in ―good faith.‖258 While MPS warrants special attention, it does not deserve
special treatment. When viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances
facing MPS, identifying, locating, and evaluating all children with disabilities
may seem like an unreasonable burden. However, the way the IDEA and case
law stand today, extrinsic factors—even difficult ones—are not taken into
account in determining if a district is in compliance with the law. 259
The IDEA is clear in its purpose: ―to ensure that all children with
disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
education . . . designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for
further education, employment, and independent living.‖ 260 MPS should be

251. Jamie S., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66447, at *4–5.
252. Id. at *10–23. The court reduced the hourly rate for paralegals and law clerks from $80.00
per hour to $50.00 per hour and from $40.00 per hour to $25.00 per hour, respectively. Id. at *6, 11.
The court found further reductions of the total hours claimed warranted. The court found reductions
appropriate for certain IEP meetings; time spent in contact with the media; a 5% reduction of hours
for the portions of the case on which plaintiffs were unsuccessful; and an additional 5% reduction of
hours for vague entries in the plaintiffs‘ 104-page exhibit it submitted detailing the fees the legal
team incurred. Id. at *14, 20, 21–22.
253. Id. at *22.
254. Id.; Settlement Agreement, supra note 110, at 18.
255. Jamie S., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66447, at *22.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 519 F. Supp. 2d 870, 904 (E.D. Wis. 2007).
259. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006).
260. Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
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required to engage in widespread remedial efforts because it directly advances
the IDEA‘s goal of ensuring that all children with disabilities are receiving a
proper education. The majority of IDEA violations involve an isolated
incident of a school district depriving one child of appropriate services under
the IDEA. 261 In Jamie S., an entire school district, the largest district in the
state, failed systemwide to comply with the IDEA and it continues to do so. 262
As a result, not just one, but hundreds of children are not receiving
appropriate services; 263 if left unremedied, potentially thousands of students
will be affected. Failing to impose widespread remedies in this case would be
in direct contravention to the IDEA‘s goal of educating all children by
allowing MPS to continue failing to provide appropriate services to its
students.
As stated, there is no qualifier in the IDEA‘s stated purpose—to educate
individuals with disabilities—that allows school districts to provide each child
a FAPE only to the extent its circumstances permit. Educating all children,
including children with disabilities, is of utmost importance. 264 The
challenges faced by MPS are significant, and these challenges undoubtedly
make compliance with Child Find more difficult; however, under the IDEA,
no obstacle encountered by MPS excuses its obligation to provide a child with
a disability a FAPE. The bottom line is that MPS fell short of its requisite
goal of identifying, locating, and evaluating all students with disabilities. As
a result of this failure, remedies and sanctions must be imposed.
The issue is not whether MPS should be required to comply with the
IDEA; clearly, for the reasons stated above it is imperative that MPS be
required to comply and resolve its systemic violations. The more pressing
issue is determining what constitutes ―satisfactory compliance‖ 265 for an urban
district like MPS. One hundred percent compliance is obviously ideal, but is
this realistic for urban school districts? Perhaps something less than 100%
compliance still constitutes satisfactory compliance, even if it does not under
the IDEA and current case law, perhaps it should in MPS‘s case. The IDEA
presents a paradox for urban school districts: it requires school districts to
identify, locate, and evaluate all children with disabilities; essentially, the
IDEA requires perfection. 266 However, the challenges faced by an urban
261. E.g., Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1986); Dep‘t of Educ. v. Cari Rae S., 158
F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Haw. 2001); Clay T. v. Walton County Sch. Dist., 952 F. Supp. 817 (M.D. Ga.
1997).
262. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 903–04.
263. Id. at 893.
264. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (explaining that ―education is perhaps
the most important function of the state and local governments‖).
265. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
266. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2006).
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school district make it impossible to achieve this standard. As a result,
something less than 100% compliance should still constitute satisfactory
compliance for MPS. What constitutes something less is likely a factintensive analysis to be determined by a court.
Even if something less than 100% compliance is acceptable under the
IDEA, MPS still has a long way to go to enter the realm of satisfactory
compliance. At one point, 17% of students identified as having disabilities at
MPS did not have a current IEP and only 81.1% of evaluations of students
had been timely completed. 267 In order to achieve satisfactory compliance a
court must impose remedies that are carefully tailored to MPS‘s urban
challenges. This certainly is no easy task. First, the court has very little
relevant precedent to use as guidance. The number of IDEA class action suits
is ―remarkably small.‖268 One author‘s research ―uncover[ed] less than 100
cases in which class actions had ever been certified to pursue claims under the
IDEA.‖269 Secondly, imposing sanctions to remedy a large urban school
district‘s systemic violations is a daunting task, and there are no guarantees
for effectiveness.270 Finally, this is a more difficult task because of the
urgency of the problem. As noted, if the systemic violations of MPS are not
remedied, potentially thousands of students with disabilities in MPS will not
receive special education services.271
In order to bring MPS into full compliance with the IDEA, the court needs
to evaluate MPS‘s situation in light of its urban challenges. 272 In other words,
the court must sufficiently tailor its remedy to the needs of an urban school
district. MPS did not account for its urban challenges in constructing its
original Child Find procedures, and consequently, the procedures were wholly
inadequate. Similarly, if the court makes the same mistake and fails to
account for urban challenges, its remedy will not correct MPS‘s systemwide
failures.
MPS, under the directive of DPI, has been attempting to comply with
Child Find since the birth of the Jamie S. litigation in 2001.273 The court
noted, ―[a]s DPI continued to insist upon more thorough internal
accountability procedures, compliance by MPS did improve in some areas,
but overall, remained uneven.‖274 One of the defendants‘ experts explained
267. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 876.
268. Bagenstos, supra note 69, at 13.
269. Id.
270. The difficulty of this task is evidenced by MPS‘s failing efforts to achieve compliance
since the advent of this case in 2001. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 877–80.
271. Id. at 893.
272. See supra Part IV.
273. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
274. Id.
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that it takes time for compliance strategies to work, but ―things are
improving.‖275 By the time the court issues its decision in Phase III it will
have had nearly two years to assess whether MPS has made any progress
toward achieving satisfactory compliance. This certainly will be a factor in
determining the level of invasiveness and the magnitude of changes required
by the court-imposed remedy. 276 Further, the court‘s duty should not end once
it issues a decision in Phase III of the trial; rather, the court should continue to
monitor MPS‘s compliance efforts and revisit and modify the remedy it
imposed if necessary. This likely is the most efficient way for MPS to
achieve the highest level of satisfactory compliance with the IDEA.
Imposing an effective remedy to bring the entire MPS district into
compliance with Child Find is no small task for the court, especially in light
of the challenges faced by an urban school district like MPS.277 Despite these
challenges, the IDEA is not wavering in its demand for full compliance in
order to receive federal funding for special education programs. 278 This is an
unattainable standard for urban school districts. Instead, something less than
100% compliance—satisfactory compliance—which takes into account a
school district‘s urban challenges, is the standard by which courts should hold
urban school districts.
VI. CONCLUSION
All states receiving federal assistance under the IDEA are required to have
in effect policies and procedures to ensure compliance with Child Find. Child
Find requires that all children with disabilities residing in the state are
―identified, located, and evaluated.‖279 In Jamie S., the court determined that
MPS violated its Child Find requirements. The violations were systemic;
therefore, MPS violated the rights of the entire class of plaintiffs. Being a
large urban school district, MPS faces a myriad of challenges that make
compliance with Child Find more difficult than in a typical suburban district.
The key challenges MPS faces are diverse student and parent demographics,
low expectations and standards, high student and teacher mobility, decreased
parental involvement, and the low level of priority that special education
receives.
Remedies for the plaintiffs and sanctions for the defendants were litigated
in Phase III of the trial. The most effective remedy, and the one most
consistent with the goal of the IDEA, is one that reforms old, ineffective
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id.
See id.
See generally DODENHOFF, supra note 189.
20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2006).
Id. § 1412(a)(3)(A).
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policies and procedures and develops new ones that MPS must implement
throughout the district. The court must tailor the policies and procedures to
account for MPS‘s urban challenges, and if necessary, revisit its remedy to
make necessary modifications. If this is not done, MPS will continue its
systemic violations of Child Find, and the Jamie S. litigation will have
achieved nothing. Further, MPS should not be required to achieve 100%
compliance with Child Find but should be held to a new standard of
substantial compliance.
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